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ABSTRACT
From the standpoint of game theory, dominoes is a game
that has not received much attention (specially the variety
known as draw). It is usually thought that this game is al-
ready solved, given general results in game theory. However,
the determination of equilibria is not feasible for the general
case because of the well known problem of node explosion
in the tree expressing the game. We propose a new model
based in limited forecast as a kind of bounded rationality
for dynamic alternate games.
1. INTRODUCTION
There are a lot of possible games to play with dominoes
tiles. The variety we analize here is known as Draw, which
is part of a bigger group called blocking games. In this kind
of games, tiles are initially randomly distributed among all
players and the one with the biggest double (a tile with the
same number in both sides) draws it on the table, starting
the game train. Afterwards, players draw tiles alternately
matching a free-end. The game ends when one player draws
all of her tiles or the game is blocked, which happens when
none of the players can draw a matching tile. At the end of
the game the sum of points in the tiles of the other players
are the winner’s profit.
Even though there are several theoretical results propos-
ing a solution to similar games, we think this is an inter-
esting problem because in practice it is not computationally
possible to apply these results to the general (i.e. with an ar-
bitrary number of points). Also the node explosion problem
makes necessary to find alternative techniques to compute
the game equilibria and to determine the best strategy in
order to get the best profit in the match.
We define a model of the game considering limitations
on forecast as referred in [1, 4, 10], but in our approach
limitations are not fixed anf instead they are a function of
some bounded optimization parameter [5].
2. PREVIOUS MODEL
Philippe Jehiel [1] presents a model of limited horizon fore-
cast applied to repeated alternate games. The key features
of this class of games are that there are two players moving
sequentially in discrete time steps. In each period t, the cur-
rent payoff for player i depends on her own action chosen in
that time and the action made by the opponent in the last
period. The action spaces are finite and remain the same
throughout the match.
It is assumed that each player has a limited ability to fore-
cast the future. Player i is characterized by the lenght of her
forecast ni (a constant). At period t, player i formulates pre-
dictions for the forthcoming ni moves after her own move.
Therefore, she must make her choice of the current action
on the basis of her limited forecast only. This is because:
1. Player i cannot build her criterion on what will come
after ni periods, since she cannot make predictions
about (she has no idea of) it, and,
2. Given the stationarity of the game, the average payoff
over the lenght of foresight may be perceived as a good
approximation of the true objective function.
Jehiel also defines a solution concept called (n1, n2)−solution
which requires two preliminary notions:
1. A strategy for player i is justified by a sequence of fore-
casts if the strategy provides actions that maximize the
average payoff obtained over the lenght of her forecast,
and,
2. A sequence of forecasts for player i is consistent with a
strategy profile if the forecast coincide with the trun-
cation to the first ni actions of the respective actions
of the respective continuation paths induced by the
strategy profile.
Hence a (n1, n2) − solution is defined as a strategy profile
that can be justified by consistent sequences for players 1
and 2. In other words, in a (n1, n2)− solution:
1. Current actions are chosen to maximize the average
payoff over the lenght of her foresight, and,
2. At any period t where player i must move, her fore-
casts for the forthcoming ni actions as a function of
her current action are correct.
It should be mentioned that the predictions for the forth-
coming ni actions include her own actions and that the
equilibrium forecasts about all these actions are assumed
to be correct whatever her current action and not only on
the equilibrum path.
Another important issue mentioned by Jehiel is the fact
that there is no improvement by incrementing the forecast
for player, since the game is cyclic.
3. OUR MODEL
In the case of dynamic alternate games, like dominoes,
there are substantial differences:
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♦ While the movements are alternated, the game is dy-
namic, meaning that the action space is updated after
each move and the search space is reduced.
♦ According to the classification presented in [2], domi-
noes is a convergent, imperfect information and sudden
death game. Given this, the length of the forecast is
not constant and forecasting can be better based upon
a function of the computing capability of the agent1.
♦ Since in games with similar nature to dominoes sub-
game perfect equilibrium can be applied, a reasonable2
approach to the solution concept could be subgame per-
fect equilibrium with limited forecast, wich would have
to compute at each period a new equilibrium according
to some desired benefit (payoff function).
♦ A problem in applying the bounded forecast to the
game of chess for instance, is the difficulty of deter-
mining a reasonable function to estimate the payoff at
the end of the horizon bounded by the forecast. In the
case of dominoes we can use heuristics or guidelines
known in the folklore of the game to determine this
payoff function [7].
In order to develop the model, it is important to have a clear
notion of awareness. Therefore, the first step is to answer
the questions raised in [3] for dominoes:
♦ Awareness of what? The player must be aware of the
actions made up to the current period of the game, as
well as the tiles she holds. In addition, she must be
aware of the actions she might take in her turn.
♦ What is the environment? The environment consists
of the current state of the game: how many tiles each
player holds and the game train. A query to the en-
vironment consists of trying to reconstruct the history
of the match using the current turn and following the
match train.
♦ What is the enumeration process? The acquisition of
the set of possible actions is made by touring the de-
cision tree of the match as the match evolves. This
path can return a set or a particular state. However,
building the entire tree requires exponential space.
♦ What is the decision making process? Once the enu-
meration returns a state or a set, she can select the
best possible action from among its outgoing edges by
following the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Now we define a model of limited horizon forecast as a func-
tion of the computing capability of the agent applied to
dynamic alternate games. The key feature of this class of
games is that there are two players moving sequentially in
discrete time steps. In each period t, the current expected
payoff for player i depends on her own action chosen in that
time and the action made by the opponent in the previous
period. The action spaces are finite and the search space is
reduced as the match evolves.
1Computing capability in this context indicates the ability to
generate and visit a certain number of nodes in the future.
2Reasonable in this context is used as a synonym for common
sense.
The latter ensures that in the final steps of the match,
the number of nodes is very small and can be determined
in reasonable time. In other words, the number of leaves
is very small compared to the number of branches at the
beginning of the match.
We assume that each player has a limited ability to forecast
the future. Player i is characterized by her ability to gen-
erate and visit states in the future ci. At period t, player i
formulates predictions for the forthcoming ni = f (ci) moves
after her own move. Therefore, she must make her choice of
the current action on the basis of her limited forecast only.
This is because:
1. Player i cannot build her criterion on what will come
after ni periods, since she cannot make predictions
about (she is not aware of) it, and,
2. The subgame perfect equilibrium payoff over the lenght
of foresight may be perceived as a good approximation
of the true objective function.
3.1 Dynamic alternate games
We consider two players indexed by i = 1, 2; player i takes
actions ai from a finite action space Ai. Players take actions
in discrete time and the horizon is finite. Time periods are
indexed by t = 1, 2, 3, .... At time t player i’s period payoff
is a function of the current actions ati of the two players
i = 1, 2.
Players take actions sequentially and player 1 moves first.
At each odd period (t = 1, 3, 5, . . .), player 1 choses an action
from her set. Similarly, player 2 choses her actions at each
even period (t = 2, 4, 6, . . .). In both cases, the action taken
modifies the immediate next action of the opponent and
reduces the search spaces of both players. We call games
like this dynamic alternate games.
A stream of action profiles
{
qti
}nmax
t=1
=
{
q2k−11 , q
2k
2
}nmax
t=1
,
where q2k−11 ∈ A1 and q2k2 ∈ A2 is known as a path and
is denoted by Q. Since players move each two periods, an
action taken at period t is combined with the action taken by
the opponent in the last period t−1 to modify the structure
of the game tree (they prune it) and therefore, the payoff of
player i induced by path Q.
Notation
1. Let Rn be an arbitrary n-length stream of actions of al-
ternate actions; φi (Rn) denotes a function that, given
the current state for player i, returns the expected pay-
off to player i induced by Rn. This function considers
both the rules of the game and/or guidelines known
from the game in question.
2. [Q]n denotes the truncation of path Q =
{
qti
}nmax
t=1
,
where n ≤ nmax, to the first n actions.
3. [q]N denotes the truncation of path q to the last N
actions.
4. (q, q′) denotes the concatenation of q =
{
qti
}s
t=v
with
q′ =
{
qti
}w
t=s+1
: (q, q′) =
{
qti
}w
t=v
.
3.2 The solution concept
Similar to Jehiel [1], we assume that players have a limited
ability to forecast the future and bounded recall ; however,
unlike his proposal, forecasting ability in our model is not
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fixed, but a function of the ability of the agent to generate
and visit future states in the game tree. The idea of having
units of brain power to study the future and partly to the
analysis of the past is maintained, but in the case of the units
dedicated to the future they are intended to dynamically
compute the next possible branches. Therefore, Player i has
a two-dimensional ability, on the one hand Ni represents
her memory capacity and, on the other side ni = f (ci)
is the number of steps that player i is able to foresight,
as a function of her ability to generate and visit. At each
period where player i must take an action, she determines
new forecasts about the future. Her forecasts are limited to
the next ni steps. Additionally, as she has bounded memory,
her forecasts about the future may only depend on the last
Ni periods and her current action.
Notation and auxiliary definitions
Let H (Ni) be the set of histories of alternate actions of
length Ni, in which last action is an element of Aj (j = i)
and h an arbitrary element of H (Ni).
1. An ni-length prediction, where ni = f (ci), for player
i is a stream of alternate actions of length ni, starting
with an action in Aj (j = i). The set of ni-length
predictions (shorter in the last steps of the match) is
denoted by Pni (a subtree).
2. An ni-length forecast for player i at a period t where
she must move is denoted by f ti . It maps, for every
history of length Ni, h ∈ H (Ni), the set of actions
Ai available for the set of predictions Pni . Formally,
f ti =
{
f ti (·|h)
}
h
, where, ∀h ∈ H (Ni) , f ti (·|h) : Ai →
Pni : f
t
i (ai|h) is the prediction about the forthcoming
ni actions made by player i at period t if she currently
choses ai given the last Ni actions h ∈ H (Ni).
3. fi =
{
f ti
}
t
denotes an arbitrary sequence of forecasts
f ti for every period t where player i must move. The
set of fi is denoted by Fi. A pair (f1, f2) ∈ F1 ×F2 is
denoted byf and F denotes the set of f .
4. A pure strategy for player i is denoted by σi. It is a
sequence of functions σti , one for each period t where
player i must take an action. The function at period t,
σti , is the behavior strategy for player i at that period.
It determines player i’s action at period t as a function
of the last Ni actions. A strategy profile (σ1, σ2) is
denoted by σ and the set of strategy profiles Σ1 × Σ2
is denoted by Σ.
Any strategy profile σ ∈ Σ generates a pathQ (σ) = {qti (σ)
}
t
,
i = 1 if t is odd and i = 2 if t is even. Let Ht be the set
of histories of alternate actions of length t and let h∗ be an
arbitrary history of length t−1, i. e., h∗ ∈ Ht−1. The strat-
egy profile and the induced path by σ on the subgame h∗ are
denoted by σ|h and Q (σ|h) respectively. Given h∗ ∈ Ht−1
and an action ai ∈ Ai at period t, the continuation path
induced by σ after (h∗, ai) is thus Q (σ|h∗ai). The set of
continuation paths at period t, referred as the continuation
set, is denoted by Qt (σ) = {(ai, Q (σ|h∗ai))}h∗ai . The se-
quence of continuation sets Qt (σ) , t = 1, 2, . . . is denoted by
Qˆ (σ) =
{
Qt (σ)
}
t
.
The key idea in this construction is that the strategies of
player i, (i. e. her choices of actions), are based on her fore-
cast, limited by her computing capability. Hence, to define
the solution concept it is necessary to (1) specify a criterion
based on forecast as a function of computing capability and
(2) show how equilibrium forecasts are related to equilibrium
strategies.
The criterion for calculating the payoff is to determine the
largest profit among all the branches in the subtree she can
see by applying subgame perfect equilibrium. Such a cri-
terion is natural, given the features of this class of games.
In the early stages (where the player cannot see the hori-
zon of the match) this criterion will indicate what action
will give her the best profit even if this profit may not be
the best in the whole game tree. In the final stages (where
player can see all subtrees from the current node) the agent
can determine the actual equilibrium and take the best ac-
tual action according to the subgame perfect equilibrium.
In other words, player assumes she can see the whole tree
and based on this assumption, she can calculate a subgame
perfect equilibrium at every turn. Formally:
Definition 1. A strategy σi ∈ Σi is justified by a sequence
of forecasts fi =
{
f ti
} ∈ Fi if at each stage player i chooses
the action that delivers the largest profit by applying sub-
game perfect equilibrium to the game tree produced by her
forecast limited by her computing capability.
We next assume that player i’s equilibrium forecasts are
related to equilibrium strategies by a consistency relation-
ship, defined as follows. Given a history h∗ of length t − 1,
and any action ai at the current period t, Q (σ|h∗ai) is the
continuation path induced by σ after (h∗ai). At period t,
the Ni last actions are h = [h
∗]Ni . Consistency requires
for every (h∗, ai), the forecast f ti (ai|h) coincides with the
truncation to the first ni = f (ci) actions of the contin-
uation path induced by σ, [Q (σ|h∗ai)]ni . In other words,
consistency means that forecasts are correct on and off the
equilibrium path. Formaly:
Definition 2. fi =
{
f ti
} ∈ Fi is consistent with σ ∈ Σ
if for every period t where player i must move: ∀ai ∈ Ai,
∀h∗ ∈ Ht−1, f ti (ai|h) = [Q (σ|h∗ai)]ni with h = [h
∗]Ni .
Now define the solution concept. A (c1, c2)−solution is a
strategy profile that can be justified by consistent forecasts
for players 1 and 2, i. e., a strategy profile that is associated
with sequences of forecasts such that (1) players choose their
actions in order to maximize the payoff received by applying
the subgame perfect equilibrium over the length of her cur-
rent forecast and (2) player i’s forecasts for the forthcoming
ni = f (ci) actions after her own move are correct on and
off the equilibrium path. Formally:
Definition 3 The solution concept. A strategy profile σ =
(σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium with limited
forecast ((c1, c2) − solution) if and only if there exist se-
quences of forecasts f = (f1, f2) ∈ F such that for i = 1, 2.
1. σi is justified for fi and
2. fi is consistent with σ.
Similarly to Jehiel, we do not provide justification for why
forecasts should be correct in equilibrium, but in [8] Je-
hiel discusses a learning process based on limited predictions
such that players eventually learn to have correct forecasts.
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Hence, players eventually behave as in (c1, c2)− solution.
3.3 Construction
Given a forecast fTi of player i at period T , if f
T
i is asso-
ciated with a (c1, c2)−solution, is it possible to derive fT−1i
backward on the sole basis of fTi ? It is not possible, because
player i generates subtrees at each period T where she must
move, hence the opponent cannot know in advance which
tree she will generate (since it depends on her computing
capability). There are two ways in wich the opponent may
foresee all the moves down to the leaves: if she has expo-
nential capability and when she is sufficiently near to the
horizon of the match; if this is the case, she will be able to
determine a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Hence in dynamic alternate games the construction is per-
formed forward, but in each period T where player i moves,
she must apply backward induction to calculate the sub-
game perfect equilibrium over the generated subtree. This
construction is similar to the forward looking procedure in-
troduced in [9].
As stated above, on each step player i generates a set
of predictions Pni of length (depth) ni = f (ci), this set
is the subtree computed at the current period. Given Pni
we apply a function that returns a payoff for each outgoing
edge from the current node to the leafs of each prediction.
When player i cannot see the real horizon of the game from
the current node this function estimates the gains from the
rules and/or guidelines known from the game in question.
Once the player can see the whole subtree starting from the
current node, the function returns the payoff for each of the
leafs. Therefore the player can obtain a series of subgame
perfect equilibria wich corresponds with a (c1, c2)−solution.
Moreover, this function is useful to make the best choice
at each time step and to generate a sequence of subtrees Pni .
Each Pni ∈ Pni meets that length (Pni) ≤ length
(
Pni+1
)
where ni is such that the current player cannot see the
leafs. Once the player is able to observe the entire subtree
from any node, the relationship is reversed length (Pni) ≥
length
(
Pni+1
)
, since the number of nodes in the last steps
of the game tree is much lower than in the early stages due
to the considerable reduction of the search space as the game
progresses.
3.4 Properties
A dynamic alternated game always has at least one sub-
game perfect equilibrium with limited forecast. By applying
a Kuhn’s Corollary of the Zermelo-von Neumann’s Theorem
[10], we guarantee the existence of a subgame perfect equi-
librium for each subtree that player i may generate, hence
we may construct a subgame perfect equilibrium with lim-
ited forecast by concatenating the equilibria calculated in
each period.
Equilibrium forecasts associated with (c1, c2) − solution
are history independent, as a decision made in the current
period is taken on the sole basis of the last action (taken by
the opponent).
3.5 When a player is better off with a larger
foresight
Given the nature of dynamic games, the search space is
reduced at each period and since the game is finite (of sudden
death), contrary to the model developed by Jehiel [1], in
this class of games player i gets advantage by having larger
computing capability and, therefore a larger foresight.
Compared to a completely random player, this model be-
haves better. At any stage, while a purely random player
chooses her actions completely at random within the range of
possible options, a player implementing the model presented
here can take into account both knowledge and preferences
of the player and other players (the guidelines).
On the other hand, this model requires less computational
power than that of “rational man”. Endowed with polyno-
mial capability, the player’s behaviour approaches that of
the rational man as the game advances.
3.6 Example
To illustrate the usefulness of the model, we now present
how to apply it to a small instance of dominoes. As stated
above, the problem with games like chess is the difficulty to
define a payoff function. However, in games like dominoes
we may use basic guides like those shown in [7] to define
the expected payoff function φ. Some of them can easily be
adapted to the case of individual games.
We consider an instance of players {1, 2} with 6 tiles (each
player gets 3 at the beginning). To show a concrete ex-
ample, player 1 gets tiles {(0, 0) , (0, 1) , (2, 2)} and player 2
{(0, 2) , (1, 1) , (1, 2)}; additionally, the computing capability
for each player is 2n with n the number of tiles each player
gets at the beginning. To simplify the example we will con-
sider the guide of drawing the tile with higher value. The
main goal of the match is to win by drawing all the tiles
she possesses first and if she cannot win in the current pe-
riod she will apply the guide mentioned above. It should
be noticed that when nodes generated by an agent do not
cover a full level, we consider the she does not possesses any
information about the truncated level, as we cannot know
what set of nodes she will generate.
The game described above generates the game tree shown
in figure 1. We observe that if player 1 draws the tile (0, 0)
in her first turn, there exists a path that gives her a gain of
3. However, as she has limited forecast she is not aware of
this possibility. At the beginning the number of levels player
1 may visit is n1 = 1; therefore she evaluates her profit with
the guide of “getting rid of heavier tokens” and she draws
tile (2, 2).
Figures show in boxes the levels that player i can generate
and visit at each turn and in light gray the branches cannot
be played. Figure 3 shows that player 2 can foresee n2 = 2
levels down.
Now player 2 has two options: draw tiles (0, 2) and (1, 2).
If she draws tile (0, 2), she might win the match; but as she
is not aware of it she chooses to draw tile (1, 2), the highest.
At this point, figure 3 shows that player 1 can only draw
tile (0, 1). She can see the complete rest of the game tree
n1 = 4 and she is aware she will win, getting a gain of 2.
Figure 4 shows the final stages of the match. Player 2
must draw tile (0, 2) but she can leave free-end [0, 0] or [2, 2]
in both cases she loses. She chooses to leave [2, 2] in order
to lock the tile (0, 0) of player 1.
This example shows that the length of the forecast grows
as the game evolves because the number of future states
is reduced at each period. This feature together with the
intrinsic finiteness of the game makes feasible to build a
subgame equilibrium (and strategies) that gets closer to the
perfect at each step.
74

 
  
















 

	






















	

	














	




	




	

	


















	




	




	

	


















	






Figure 1: Full game tree
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Figure 2: Game tree after the first turn of player 1
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Figure 3: Game tree after the first turn of player 2
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Figure 4: Game tree in the final stages of the match
4. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHERWORK
In this paper we have proposed a model of limited foresight
as a function of the computing capability of an agent applied
to the class of dynamic alternate games. We also define a
solution concept called subgame perfect equilibrium with
limited forecast which uses the well known subgame perfect
equilibrium for each subtree that player builds at each period
of the game.
Additionally, we provide a couple of properties for the
class of games as well as the solution concept. Finally, we
show a concrete example of the model applied to an instance
of the game dominoes in order to show its applicability.
We intend to extend the results in this paper in the fol-
lowing directions:
♦ Currently we seek to prove that our model performs
better than a purely random one.
♦ Develop a generic mathematical model applicable to a
class of games, not only dominoes.
♦ Derive other interesting properties about the solution
concept.
♦ Present concrete examples on how to use the model,
initially by applying it to dominoes adding several guides
and then with other dynamic games.
♦ Obtain models that combine other characterizations of
bounded rationality.
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Appendix
Kuhn’s Corollary of the Theorem of Zermelo-
von Neumann
A general n-person game Γ with perfect infor-
mation always has an equilibrium point in pure
strategies [10].
Basic strategies for dominoes
Here are descriptions of basic moves and strate-
gies [7].
1. Commanding/Leading a Strong Num-
ber. Generally a player should lead a strong
number with the objective of playing it later
in the game. A strong number is a number
that occurs often in a player’s hand.
2. Indicating/Showing the Number of the
Double Tile. A player should command a
number that includes any respective double
tile in her hand, so that her partner knows
her most difficult tiles to play.
3. Hitting/Blocking a Number Commanded
by the Opposition. When a player blocks
a number led by the opposition.
4. Leaving a Number Open. When a player
avoids drawing a number that he has been
trying to play.
5. Repeating a Number. A player should
repeat a strong number.
6. Taking Care of the Hand. When a player
avoids being void at a given number.
7. Avoid Leading an Orphan Number.
Generally, leading an orphan number should
be avoided because the player who does so
is providing inaccurate information to her
partner. An orphan number is a number
that occurs only once in a hand.
8. Protecting Your Partner/Avoiding a
Possible Pass. If a player does not have
the relative control of her couple, she should
avoid forcing her partner to pass on her
next turn.
9. Indicating/Showing Your Type of Hand.
Each player should try to show the value of
her hand (low or high) so that her partner
knows the tiles she should try to play.
10. Stealing the Game. When a player does
not have the relative control of her couple,
she should hit a number commanded by her
partner with her own strong number.
11. Playing Aggressively (for Low Hands).
A player should try to play in a manner that
high tiles cannot be played if she feels that
her couple can win the game or she does
not have a high hand with at least one high
double hand.
From this strategy comes the first objec-
tive of dominoes: try to win by getting the
highest amount of points.
12. Playing Conservatively (for High Hands).
A player should try to play in a manner
that high tiles are played if she feels that
her couple cannot win the game or she has
a high hand with at least one high double
hand.
From this strategy comes the second objec-
tive of dominoes: try to lose by giving the
lowest amount of points.
13. Playing to Accumulate Points. The
couple has the option to play aggressively
(for low hands) if the score is not close to
the upper limit of points.
14. Playing not to Accumulate Points. The
couple should play conservatively (for high
hands) if the score is close to the upper limit
of points. The definition of a “close” score
is subjective and depends on the player’s
appraisal.
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